Vol. 1 Japan Wasn’t the Starting Line

For many global technology companies, entering the Japanese market is a major strategic decision. Should they establish a local subsidiary first? Hire a team on the ground? Or seek out partners before committing capital?

Mattermost took a different path.
Ian Tien, CEO of Mattermost, learned early in his career—during his time at Microsoft—that Japan is not a market to be approached in the same way as the United States. Later, at Mattermost, he focused on building collaboration platforms for environments where security, control, and reliability are non-negotiable: manufacturing, government, critical infrastructure, and defense.
How did those experiences shape Mattermost’s view of Japan? And why did the company choose to enter the market only after demand had clearly emerged, rather than leading with a local legal entity?

In this interview, Tien explains the thinking behind a demand-led market entry—and what other global CEOs can learn from it.

“Japan Is Not the U.S.”—A Lesson Learned Early

Q: To begin, could you share your background and the perspective you bring as CEO of Mattermost?

Ian Tien: One of the most formative experiences for me was working at Microsoft before joining Mattermost. At Microsoft, Japan was positioned as a critically important market from a very early stage in the company’s history.

Personally, I learned that Japan should not be viewed in the same way as the U.S. The level of quality expected, the importance of long-term trust, and the way customers perceive risk—all of these differ meaningfully from other markets. Those lessons have had a strong influence on how we think about Japan at Mattermost.

From the beginning, our mission has been to deliver better technology to people working in mission-critical environments. In industries like manufacturing, government, critical infrastructure, and defense, organizations often operate in highly secure or closed environments. Ironically, those are often the places forced to rely on outdated or inconvenient tools.

We want to provide modern, secure collaboration platforms that work even under those constraints. Seen in that light, entering the Japanese market was not just geographic expansion—it was directly connected to our mission.

Japan Was Already Using Mattermost Before There Was a Japanese Office

Q: Mattermost’s entry into Japan seems different from a typical “market expansion.”

Ian Tien: That’s right. Rather than saying we “entered” Japan from zero, it’s more accurate to say that Mattermost was already being used in Japan before we established a local subsidiary.

Japanese customers discovered our open-source product and evaluated it on its technical merits and security posture. Before we ever opened an office, there was already trust and real business happening. That gave us confidence that we could succeed in Japan.

In that sense, the Japanese entity was not the starting point. It was the next step—formalizing and deepening relationships that already existed.

Open Source as the First Point of Contact

Q: How did those early connections with the Japanese market come about?

Ian Tien: We started by offering a free, open-source product. In Japan, in Korea, and across Asia, more and more people began using it. Because it was free, the initial barrier to adoption was low.
As people used the product, they discovered its value. Eventually, they reached a point where they felt, “This isn’t enough—we want to use it more seriously.”

That’s when inquiries started coming into our headquarters.
In Japan, this later evolved into a purchasing flow through resellers. What mattered most to us was that we could clearly see a signal of intent: people wanted to buy.
That signal existed before we created a legal entity. And that made all the difference.

Demand First, Structure Second

Q: So rather than wanting to enter Japan, Japan wanted Mattermost first?

Ian Tien: Exactly. We didn’t start by making a large upfront investment and declaring, “Now we sell in Japan.”

Instead, users found the product themselves, started using it, adapted it to their own workflows, and gradually formed the conviction that “this is necessary.” Once that intent became visible, we were able to move together with partners and resellers.

What matters most is whether customers genuinely want the product. If they do, partners will follow. But if that demand is weak, simply setting up sales channels or corporate structures rarely works well.

Reducing Perceived Risk Is the CEO’s Job

Q: In Japan, there’s often a strong focus on whether a company will truly stay in the market.

Ian Tien:That’s an extremely important point. Japanese customers don’t evaluate products on specifications alone. They also ask, “Is this company really committed to this market?”

There are many cases where U.S. companies enter Japan, then withdraw after a few years, leaving customers without support. That’s a very negative experience.

That’s why establishing a local entity, visiting Japan repeatedly, hiring people with experience working with Japanese companies, and committing to long-term partnerships all matter. Ultimately, I see my role as reducing the risk that customers feel.

The Role of Long-Term Japanese Partners

Q: Did long-standing relationships with major Japanese companies play a role in building trust?

Ian Tien:Absolutely. Having major Japanese IT services companies as long-term users—and also as partners—was incredibly important for us.

We didn’t just learn from them as customers; we learned a great deal about quality expectations. Meeting Japanese standards isn’t just about bringing a product into the market. The product has to be used, supported, and proven again and again.

By working closely with trusted partners and showing our own commitment, we were able to build credibility in the Japanese market.

What Other Global Companies Can Learn

Q:Your approach seems quite unique. What can other foreign companies learn from it?

Ian Tien:It’s true that our case has unique elements. We already had customers and relationships in Japan well before establishing a subsidiary.

That said, there are transferable lessons. One is not trying to do everything at once. We first brought in advisors who deeply understood the Japanese market to help shape our strategy. Then we gradually added people responsible for local execution.

In any market—but especially in Japan—how you enter and who you enter with matters just as much as what you sell.

A Final Message to CEOs Considering Japan

Q:Finally, what would you say to CEOs thinking about entering Japan?

Ian Tien:Japan is not a market that opens automatically just because you set up an office.
However, if you offer something genuinely valuable, if there are customers who truly need it, and if you have a system to listen carefully to those signals, Japan can become an incredibly strong market.

The key is not to get the order wrong. It’s not about entering with fanfare. It’s about finding real signals of demand first—and then investing seriously. That sequence is what separates companies that stay from those that leave.

To be continued in Vol. 2